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Whether the quality of agricultural products is safe or not is related to issues of food safety and low carbon production in agriculture. Based on evolutionary game theory, this paper establishes a game model among government, farmers and consumers and analyzes the dynamic evolutionary process and evolutionary stable strategies of the major stakeholders. The results show that: (i) government subsidy coefficient, farmers' penalty coefficient for not producing, consumer trust coefficient and willingness to pay carbon labelled agricultural products premium are positively related to farmers' adoption of low-carbon production behaviour, and fraud penalty coefficient and farmers' cost of adopting low-carbon production technology are negatively related; (ii) farmers' sensitivity to government regulation policies is: fraud penalty coefficient = farmers' cost of adopting low-carbon production technology > government subsidy The sensitivity of farmers to government regulation policies is: fraud penalty coefficient = cost of low-carbon production technology > government subsidy > penalty coefficient for non-production, and the sensitivity of farmers to direct market stimulation is: consumer trust coefficient > coefficient of willingness to pay premium for carbon labelled agricultural products, and the additional benefit coefficient has no significant effect on farmers' decision-making; (iii) In the early stage, the source control of food safety mainly depends on the government's policy intervention. In the later stage, the establishment of carbon label agricultural products market incentive mechanism can achieve long-term stable and effective source control of food safety.
Xie et al. (Mon,) studied this question.