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Abstract With robots increasingly assuming social roles (e.g., assistants, companions), anthropomorphism (i.e., the cognition that an entity possesses human characteristics) plays a prominent role in human–robot interactions (HRI). However, current conceptualizations of anthropomorphism in HRI have not adequately distinguished between precursors, consequences, and dimensions of anthropomorphism. Building and elaborating on previous research, we conceptualize anthropomorphism as a form of human cognition, which centers upon the attribution of human mental capacities to a robot. Accordingly, perceptions related to a robot’s shape and movement are potential precursors of anthropomorphism, while attributions of personality and moral value to a robot are potential consequences of anthropomorphism. Arguing that multidimensional conceptualizations best reflect the conceptual facets of anthropomorphism, we propose, based on Wellman’s (1990) Theory-of-Mind (ToM) framework, that anthropomorphism in HRI consists of attributing thinking, feeling, perceiving, desiring, and choosing to a robot. We conclude by discussing applications of our conceptualization in HRI research.
Kühne et al. (Tue,) studied this question.