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Abstract Many scholars have highlighted the individual, organizational and inter-organizational causes of organizational wrongdoing; others have focused on its (negative) consequences or have analyzed how it can persist and spread between organizations. An underlining assumption shared by many of those studies is that organizational wrongdoing is a deviant, society-damaging phenomenon originating from individual and organizational actors’ pursuit of undue advantages. We argue that, at least in some cases, actors may also have “organizational reasons” for wrongdoing, besides self-interest. This article aims at analyzing the organizational reasons for wrongdoing in the CSM affair, a scandal that shed light on the deviant practices for career paths within the Italian judiciary system. By relying on documents and several semi-structured interviews to judges, public prosecutors, and experts in the field, we reconstructed actual practices for career advancement (extra-legal governance) and compared them with formal policies (legal governance). Our analysis shows that deviant practices were not merely occasional episodes of favoritism, but were part of an extra-legal governance system that involved virtually all of Italy’s judges. We also found that the CSM decoupled formal policies from actual practices to manage two organizational trade-offs – bureaucratic rules vs. efficiency, and independence vs. accountability. Therefore, besides individual gain, actors had two major “organizational reasons” for wrongdoing: first, they needed to cope with a lack of organizational capabilities and resources; second, they needed to address calls for greater accountability. In the light of our findings, we conclude with some considerations about organizational learning and the relation between law, organizations, and wrongdoing.
Catino et al. (Mon,) studied this question.