Interpretations and Counterarguments: Replies to my interlocutors

It seems best to begin with questions regarding the deficits or conceptual short circuits in my theory of modernity; they are most forcefully raised by Antje Linkenbach and Peter Wagner. One of the basic issues, possibly the likeliest source of controversy, is the distinction between normative and non-normative perspectives; or, perhaps more precisely, the very possibility of such a distinction. It is obviously true that I insist on treating the concept of modernity as a non-normative category. Modernity is neither an unfulfilled project, nor a culturally grounded promissory note, nor the culmination of an evolutionary logic. New forms of social inequality, great power politics (including colonial expansion), global wars and totalitarian regimes are integral parts of the modern world; and I unreservedly agree with Peter’s concluding statement about modernity being on the brink of failure. This view is fundamental to my comparative historical analyses. But it does not mean that my approach is wholly non-normative. Compared to theorists like Habermas or Honneth, the normative element in my work is minimalist and inherently self-critical, yet not insignificant. It may best be described as a version of the position that Castoriadis indicated but did not take the trouble to spell out. To be brief, it begins with the point that the quest for articulate understanding is guided by a normative orientation: the regulative idea of an autonomous effort to make sense – reasoned sense, to be more explic-