A pull versus push framework for reputation

Reputation has a profound influence on psychology and behavior, and can be leveraged for social good.In many important contexts, however, we have strong evidence that reputation is functioning, but do not deeply understand how reputation is functioning, from a game-theoretic perspective.The game-theoretic reputation literature highlights different ways that reputation systems can function. However, these insights have not been well connected to the empirical reputation literature, despite their potential to shed new light on established reputational phenomena, and guide the design of reputation-based interventions.This article seeks to bridge this gap by proposing a reputation framework that highlights two fundamentally different ways that reputation can function, and by outlining how these mechanisms might give rise to divergent patterns of psychology and behavior. Humans are deeply concerned with reputations (see Glossary) – both their own and those of others. 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