Hostage to Infrastructural Contradictions in the Caucasus: Nagorno-Karabakh After 2020

Introduction. The article defines the nodal intersections of international transport corridors in the South Caucasus. Nagorno-Karabakh, after the 2020 war, is isolated from the donor country, and the prospects for its existence are beginning to depend more and more on transport diplomacy in the region. Methods and materials. The study is based on the concept of F. Braudel on the territorial organization of space. To analyze the current regional situation around Nagorno-Karabakh after 2020, strategic documents, news reports, interviews, and statements by officials of the countries of the region and representatives of regional powers were used. Analysis. The transport isolation of Nagorno-Karabakh undertaken by Azerbaijan after 2020, while simultaneously developing transport infrastructure bypassing it and the central regions of Armenia, created conditions for a humanitarian crisis in the unrecognized state. During the negotiations with Armenia, the fate of the Karabakh population is becoming more closely associated with the development of transport infrastructure in the region, calling into question the participation of Armenia itself in the development of projects. This situation forces its Prime Minister to take unpopular measures, gradually yielding to Baku’s demands. Azerbaijan, having taken part in the implementation of European transport projects, is developing new ones with the participation of China, Russia, Turkey, and Iran. The unresolved conflict hinders the security of investments in the region. The speed of development of competing transport corridors does not create prerequisites for long-term projects to resolve the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh. Results. Thanks to Azerbaijan’s initiative, new transport geography is being formed in the South Caucasus, creating diversified corridors for Azerbaijan and Turkey, and at the same time increasing the Russian Federation and Iran’s dependence on the level of relations with these states. Taking into account Azerbaijan’s negotiations with Iran as well as Russia’s interest in the development of the North-South ITC, it can be assumed that tougher steps will be taken in the future with regard to the Nagorno-Karabakh as well as the Zangezur corridor.