Pathways to Cooperation: A Relational Theory of Rebel Alliance Formation

Why do some rebel organizations form a united front when others confine themselves to a loose partnership? Existing research on rebel movements reveals that insurgents should quickly leave cooperative agreements if doing so will provide particular advantages in a post-conflict setting. Still, rebel groups may build diverse alliances, from joint attacks to shared command structures. If rebels are indeed purely pragmatic, why would they tie themselves to partnerships that hinder their ability to defect easily? In this article, I argue that three relational factors shape how armed groups cooperate: rebel-civilian relations (civilian support), inter-rebel relations (partners), and rebel-sponsor relations (external patrons). Groups connected through these social networks will be more likely to join a united opposition with their shared channels of trust. Developing a new dyadic dataset, I find that sharing allies or civilian support is positively associated with forming united fronts. Yet, state sponsorship does not produce similar results.