Destructively Independent. The Russian Central Bank Leadership in the Runup to the 1993 Constitutional Crisis

Abstract Attempts to get control over the Russian Central Bank are often seen as a key driver of the conflict between the Supreme Soviet and the Russian government in 1993. We argue here that the bank and its leadership were not only an instrument of other power centers but should be considered as active and fairly independent political players with their own interests, stakes, and strategies. In the struggle over monetary policy in the early years of the newly founded Russian Federation, inherited Soviet networks of power were more decisive than legal competences on paper. To the extent that ideas played a role at all in these transitional power struggles, their distinction was not between neoliberal shock therapy and social democratic gradualism, but between different notions of the future realm of Moscow’s financial power. Our paper is based on an assessment of biographical literatures and legal texts as well as a survey of the scholarly literature in economics and history. It shows how, in a phase of post-imperial institutional reconfiguration, different groups of the former Soviet elite competed to preserve their status in the emerging Russian nation state.