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The evolution of the automobile market is a macro-expression of the behavior of automakers’ production decisions. This study examines the competitive environment between new energy vehicles (NEVs) and conventional fuel vehicles (CFVs) and develops a game-theoretical model incorporating consumer utility, automaker profit, and the competitive density of NEVs and CFVs. It aims to assess how consumers’ preferences for vehicle range and smart features influence automakers’ strategic decisions and the broader market evolution under the Dual Credit Policy. The findings indicate: (1) A low NEV credit price facilitates NEV market size growth, but this growth rate diminishes beyond a certain price threshold; (2) The lower the consumer’s range preference, the higher NEV credit price can accelerate the development of new energy vehicles to their saturation value. However, when consumers in the market prioritize smart features, increasing the NEV credit price does not significantly influence the growth of NEV market size. (3) Higher consumer preferences for both range and smart features, combined with increased NEV credit prices, can synergistically accelerate the speed of the NEV market to reach the saturation value and also raise the saturation value of the scale of NEVs. And higher consumer range preference combined with increased NEV credit prices has a more significant effect on the promotion of NEV market size than the combined effect of higher consumer smart preference and increased NEV credit prices. The actual data of China’s automobile market is used in the simulation of this model. The model and its simulation results effectively explain and reveal the evolutionary impacts of consumers’ range and smart feature preference on the promotion of China’s NEVs under the Dual Credit Policy to provide effective technological and theoretical support for the promotion of the sustainable development of China’s NEV industry.
Xie et al. (Thu,) studied this question.