Fast or stable: Research on dynamic behaviors of duopoly automakers under the background of energy transformation in the automobile industry

New energy vehicles (NEVs) are crucial way to solving environmental and energy dilemmas. However, the transition from traditional energy vehicles (TEVs) to NEVs is extremely intricate. If the process for TEVs switching to NEVs falls into out order, the automobile industry will be shaken. This paper takes electric vehicles (EVs), representing NEVs, and internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEVs), representing TEVs, as research objects, and constructs a dynamic Gounod duopoly model for the production decisions of two oligopolistic automakers under the dual credit policy. Combining the nonlinear dynamics theory and Cournot game, the influence of policy, market, technology, and cost on the equilibrium stability of duopoly automakers' dynamic production game and the nonlinear evolution characteristics of Cournot-Nash equilibrium are analyzed systematically. Results show that: (1) In the transition from ICEVs to EVs, if the speed of production adjustment is too fast, the automobile system would trap into chaos and shakeouts, and the social welfare also would show volatility. (2) The revised dual credit policy increases the credit ratio and decreases the credit coefficient which enhances the stability of automobile system. This revision may accelerate the transformation from ICEVs to EVs in the automobile industry. Especially, the credit coefficient plays a more significant role. (3) The consumer acceptance for vehicle prices and the range of EV are positively correlated with the production of EVs and the social welfare, and negatively correlated with the production of ICEVs. Nevertheless, the cost of the two vehicle categories had the opposite effect compared price acceptance and range of EVs.