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On the morning of 7 October 2023, at 6:29 AM, Israel was surprised when forces of the Hamas organization attacked Israel from the Gaza Strip, along the border between Gaza and Israel, and caused enormous damage to human life and property. On that day, about 1,300 Israelis were killed, most of them civilians and the rest soldiers. About 240 Israelis were kidnapped and taken into Gaza as hostages. Israel had no concrete warning of the coming attack. It was a complete surprise to the Intelligence Community (IC) and security system. Following this attack, Israel went to war against Hamas, in Gaza, calling it the Iron Swords War, with the intent of collapsing its military power and governing rule. The lack of intelligence warning raises many questions about the capability of the Israeli IC, especially the Israel Military Intelligence Directorate (IMI) and the Israel Security Agency (ISA). Israel's intelligence had known of the strengthening of Hamas, but there was an assumption that Hamas had changed its objectives and aimed to establish its rule and statehood in Gaza. As a result, it was assumed that Hamas would refrain from offensive action that would, in turn, provoke counterattacks by Israel, which would not serve its interests. The Israeli IC assumed that if Hamas decided to attack, the ISA and the IMI would provide early warning. Only on 7 October did Israel learn that Hamas was secretly intensifying its efforts to prepare an attack on Israel.
Avner Barnea (Tue,) studied this question.