The principle of procedural economy in judicial proceeding (discussion aspects)

This article analyzes the problematic issues of the principle of procedural economy in judicial proceedings. It is determined that, based on the philological approach, the principle of procedural economy in judicial proceedings means frugality, economy in spending something in a judicial proceeding. The author emphasizes that sometimes, under the guise of observance of the principle of procedural economy, the judicial proceedings implement ideas which, under certain conditions, are quite far from procedural economy. Such is the idea introduced by the Supreme Court into the court practice of the impossibility of the plaintiff’s use of an ineffective method of protection of the violated right when applying to court. The study concluded that under certain conditions it promotes procedural economy, but is questionable given its possible inconsistency with current legislation and the principle of discretionary judicial proceedings. In some cases, the application of effective remedy provisions is detrimental to procedural economy. An example of this may be a court’s dismissal of a claim on the grounds that the plaintiff has filed a claim with an ineffective remedy at the cassation stage. The author concludes that a cassation court has no right to dismiss a claim on the grounds that the plaintiff has chosen an ineffective method of defense of the violated right, if the lower courts (first instance or appellate court) have not done so after having protected the plaintiff’s right. This is due to the existence of the principle of procedural economy in judicial proceedings. It would be advisable to enshrine the relevant criterion in case law and procedural legislation. The author critically assesses the opinion expressed in science that the content of the principle of procedural economy includes the contribution of such economy to the correct resolution of a case. The author concludes that the provision on the promotion of procedural economy to the correct resolution of a case should lie outside the relevant principle, since it is a manifestation of other principles of judicial procedure.