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Exceptionalism and Comparability—Dual Citizenship in Israel after October 7th Ben Herzog (bio) Keywords October 7, Israel, Hamas, Dual citizenship, Multiple membership, Immigration, Hostages October 7th marks the most traumatic day in Israeli history. Academically and socially, we feel that the horrific events have shaken the very foundations of our existence in Israel and the Zionist project in general. The unimaginable number of casualties and hostages makes us believe things must change. As the events are still unfolding, we cannot be certain what will change and to what extent. Scientifically, we do not have the tools to analyze the ongoing situation retrospectively. However, we can observe some tendencies that are already taking place. In the following pages, I assess perceptions regarding dual citizenship in Israel in the past and today. I argue that while political or military conceptions will likely be transformed, there is evidence that views about multiple national memberships have not changed. Dual citizenship, which was seen as a normative deviance in the past, has been regularized and is socially accepted. The events on October 7th have not changed this sociological trajectory. This observation will contribute to the debate over Israel's scientific exceptionalism and comparability and draw attention to the stability and durability of global sociological structures. Immigration and the acquisition of new citizenship evoke strong emotional reactions in that they involve both highly symbolic and institutional transformation. Becoming an official part of a new community and acquiring the associated new rights and responsibilities have tremendous effects on new citizens. These changes are especially celebrated in countries that place immigration at the core of their cultural ethos and political considerations. End Page 112 Hence, the common denominator of many recent studies on citizenship is the articulation of immigration and naturalization processes in relation to the conception of citizenship and nationhood in a particular country. This is because the regulations governing entrance into the national community and inclusion of new members in it are dependent on the understanding of who, in the first place, should belong to the national "we" and who should not.1 Although citizenship and immigration policy are not the same thing, immigration policies are usually derived from the understanding of citizenship prevalent in a given country. One of the main methods of investigating citizenship empirically is by looking at who can become a citizen through immigration. "Admission and exclusion are at the core of communal independence. They suggest the deepest meaning of self-determination".2 Determining who becomes a member is the state's way of shaping and defining the national community.3 Until the Second World War, it was believed that the singularity of the nation should be protected at all costs. Dual citizenship was perceived as an imminent threat to the continuation of this world order that presupposes a one-on-one relationship between the individual and the state. Most countries were suspicious of divided national loyalties and established grounds for expatriation to regulate the singularity of nationality. Multiple citizenship was regarded in this context as illegitimate or even immoral. In an unpublished essay cited by Gerhard Caper and Stephen Krasner, Alexander Hamilton, himself an immigrant, used marriage as a metaphor for citizenship: A dispassionate and virtuous citizen . . . will regard his own country as a wife to whom he is bound to be exclusively faithful and affectionate. And he will watch with a jealous attention every propensity of his heart to wander towards a foreign country, which he will regard as a mistress that may pervert his fidelity and mar his happiness. The ideal citizen, Hamilton asserted, owed allegiance to only one state. Over the years, many other politicians and public figures have expressed the same conviction. Theodore Roosevelt, for example, maintained that citizenship, like identity, cannot be divided. Until the middle of the twentieth century, the standard position was that dual citizenship should be eradicated. In order to be a "true" citizen, one ought to have complete and undivided loyalty to the state.4 Moreover, over the years, dual citizens were accused of having privileges that most other citizens could not acquire. The End Page 113 most significant ones are the protection by more than one country and...
Ben Herzog (Fri,) studied this question.