Deconstruction as Ethics without Result

This paper investigates the ethics of deconstruction by considering it as a form of "resultless" thinking in the sense Hannah Arendt gave to that term: as the destabilization rather than the production of rules, norms, and criteria. In section II, I distinguish deconstruction's specific resultlessness from Arendtian "self-destruction," skeptical suspension, and Socratic irony, for whom resultlessness issues from the symmetrical cancelling out of equal counter-arguments. To the foremost objection to the resultlessness of thinking (the Arendtian "danger" that thinking is unable to respond to the urgent demand for results), deconstruction opposes a reconceptualization of the very notions of "urgency" and "danger." But such reconceptualization still does not amount to a justification for a deconstructive ethics: I argue in section III that deconstruction always performatively relates to a threefold danger that constitutes its "anxiety." At the core of this anxiety is the resistance to reassurance and "good conscience." I conclude, in section IV, by asking whether the ethics of deconstruction can perhaps be qualified – if not through its results or principles – as a "fundamental attunement" Grundstimmung, by comparing deconstruction's anxiety to Kierkegaard's resistance to righteousness and good conscience, in the latter's revaluation of wonder as the fundamental attunement of philosophy.