Cross-Strait Tensions and Southeast Asia's Middle Powers: A Singaporean Perspective

Cross-Strait Tensions and Southeast Asia's Middle Powers:A Singaporean Perspective Benjamin Ho (bio) Taiwan appears to be looming larger on the strategic radars of Southeast Asian states, and vice versa. Reflecting growing concerns regarding the rise in cross-strait tensions and the attendant risks of major-power conflict, traditionally reticent Southeast Asian leaders are displaying greater willingness to publicly express their fears. Taiwan, too, appears to be seeking closer ties with Southeast Asia, as seen most prominently through President Tsai Ing-wen's signature "New Southbound Policy," which aims to reduce the island's overwhelming economic dependence on China by diversifying its trade ties, especially with members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This essay argues, however, that there is less to this apparent tightening of relations than it might appear and that the gap between Taiwan and Southeast Asia remains substantial, their geographic proximity notwithstanding. For a variety of reasons on Taipei's part, high-level support for Taiwan's New Southbound Policy has not translated into closer relations in practice, and Southeast Asian governments have been reluctant to get too close to Taiwan for fear of unduly antagonizing Beijing. The Biden administration's current approach to Southeast Asia attempts to co-opt the subregion's states onto the U.S. side in a new cold war against China. This essay suggests that Washington would be better off encouraging Southeast Asian middle powers, such as Singapore, to view growing cross-strait tensions through the lens of their implications for the international rules-based order on which these states ultimately depend for their much-cherished autonomy. Such an approach stands the best chance of encouraging Southeast Asia's middle powers to play a more active role vis-à-vis the Taiwan flashpoint and exercise what agency they do possess. Southeast Asia's Growing Anxieties To illustrate the disquiet that cross-strait tensions have generated in Southeast Asia, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' meeting, which took place End Page 40 just two days after then House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's August 2022 visit to Taiwan, issued a joint statement expressing concerns with the "international and regional volatility…which could destabilize the region leading to miscalculation, serious confrontation, open conflicts and unpredictable consequences among major powers."1 The statement called for "maximum restraint, refraining from provocative action and for upholding the principles enshrined in the UN Charter and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia," and it reiterated ASEAN member states' "support for their respective One-China Policy."2 Given the usual reluctance of Southeast Asian leaders to even mention the Taiwan issue in formal meetings and statements, let alone to collectively express their support for the one-China policy, this statement is highly reflective of the anxiety that the subregion is experiencing regarding deteriorating cross-strait relations. Indeed, there is growing recognition that any conflict in the Taiwan Strait would have broader consequences, including the possibility of a regional or even global war, given the numerous actors and stakeholders involved. Singapore's foreign minister highlighted the threat posed by cross-strait relations during his country's annual committee of supply debate: The Taiwan Strait has become a more dangerous flashpoint… Whilst neither the U.S. nor China seek a military conflict over Taiwan, the fact is that missteps or mishaps can easily trigger a cycle of tit-for-tat actions and reactions that spiral dangerously out of control. A conflict over Taiwan will have global repercussions, and a much more direct impact on Singapore than the ongoing war in Ukraine. Not only is Taiwan much closer to us geographically, but our ties with the United States, China, and Taiwan are much stronger and deeper compared to our ties with Russia and Ukraine.3 At the same time, however, it remains far from clear whether Southeast Asian governments are willing to jeopardize their relations with Beijing to either forge deeper relations with Taipei or attempt more actively to ameliorate rising tensions across the Taiwan Strait. Instead, these countries continue to exercise caution by and large because they do not wish to antagonize China by being seen as too close to Taiwan. Thus, ASEAN End Page 41 members...