Strategic Alliance Governance Through Termination Provisions: Safeguard and Incentive, Flexibility and Commitment

Termination provisions establish vital governance mechanisms in alliances, offering essential safeguards and incentives by providing the flexibility to exit (underperforming) partnerships. However, they can also foster distrust and instability by potentially undermining commitment and continuity. We argue that the motivation behind termination provisions lies in the need to address safeguarding and flexibility concerns arising from increases in alliance scope, upfront payments, and technological uncertainty. Conversely, alliances with strong relational commitment and social embeddedness stemming from prior and indirect ties tend to omit termination provisions. Drawing on an analysis of 1,576 biopharmaceutical alliance contracts, we scrutinize various conditional and unconditional termination rights, along with their partner-specific allocations. Among other findings, we observe a positive association between broad alliance scope and termination rights for patent challenge, for lack of reasonable effort, and for specific countries assigned to the research and development (R&D) firm contributing technological expertise and, furthermore, termination rights for convenience for the client firm sponsoring the alliance. Larger unilateral upfront payments increase the likelihood that the client firm receives termination rights for lack of reasonable effort and for convenience. Higher technological uncertainty is associated with termination rights for convenience for the client or R&D firm. In contrast, prior ties negatively correlate with termination rights for convenience for the client firm, while indirect ties show a negative association with termination rights for convenience and specific countries for the R&D firm. Conceptually, our study highlights the relevance of termination provisions as elastic governance mechanisms that enable partners to accommodate postcontractual disturbances.