Principles of independence and accountability in the activities of the European Central Bank and the central bank of the EU member state

The scientific article is devoted to the study of the principles of independence and accountability in the activities of the European Central Bank and the central bank of the EU member state. The article focuses attention on Art. 108 and Art. 109 of the Treaty on the Establishment of the European Community, which is an integral part of the Treaty on the European Union, which contain norms according to which both the European Central Bank and the central banks of the EU member states must be independent, and on the national legislation of the EU member states and Ukraine, according to which national banks are economically independent bodies. It was established that the principle of independence in the activities of the European Central Bank presupposes the absence of external and internal influence on the part of EU institutions, their employees, members of the governments of the EU member states on decision-making by the European Central Bank, but the principle of independence in the activities of the European Central Bank does not include the prohibition of free exchange opinions between the above­mentioned subjects and the European Central Bank within the framework of the existing EU institutional mechanism. Doctrinal approaches to the principles of independence and accountability in the activities of national banks of states are analyzed. It is argued that the degree of independence of one or another branch of state power cannot be an object for comparison with the central bank of the state, since this contradicts the content of the very principle of independence of one or another branch of government, and also levels the system of checks and balances as such - the Central Bank of the State does not belong to any of the three branches of state power and is not the fourth branch of power, although it is a special central body of state administration. The central bank of the state cannot be isolated from other bodies of state power - on the contrary, in the balancing of state powers between the bodies of state power, its importance is no less important, but this does not give grounds for classifying it as one of the three branches state power to separate into the fourth branch of power. It has been established that in the legal literature the principle of independence in the activities of the Central Bank of the State is identified with functional and/or legal autonomy. An argument is given that refutes this approach. The principle of independence in the activity of the Central Bank of the EU member state is characterized. It was established that the principle of accountability corresponds to the principle of independence in the activities of the Central Bank of the State. This principle is characterized.