Energy and Power: Germany in the Age of Oil, Atoms, and Climate Change by Stephen G. Gross (review)

Reviewed by: Energy and Power: Germany in the Age of Oil, Atoms, and Climate Change by Stephen G. Gross Dolores L. Augustine Energy and Power: Germany in the Age of Oil, Atoms, and Climate Change. By Stephen G. Gross. New York: Oxford University Press, 2023. Pp. viii + 408. Hardcover 55. 00. ISBN 9780197667712. The year 2023 brought many worrisome signs of an escalation of human-caused climate change. This growing crisis is having a profound impact on the field of German history, as exemplified by Stephen G. Gross's important study on energy transitions in Germany since 1945. Gross demystifies the interplay of economic ideas, politics, and developments in world resources markets and technologies in his analysis of five major energy transitions in West Germany and reunited Germany since 1945, involving coal, petroleum, natural gas, nuclear power, and renewable energy. Though capitalist in orientation, German policymakers did not succumb to what he terms "market fetishization. " They realized that so-called energy markets were, in fact, controlled by a small number of giant corporations. In formulating energy policies, they demonstrated tremendous adaptability and ability to learn from experience, thanks to their openness to debate and political back-and-forth with experts and business interests. Big economic ideas rooted in ideology loom large in this study. The old energy paradigm, originating in the era of the Wirtschaftswunder, centered on the "coupling paradigm, " which posited that an economy could only grow if its energy usage increased, and Ordoliberalism, which asserted that the state needed to intervene to fight economic concentration and strengthen competition and the market mechanism. Another orthodoxy of this period was that low energy prices were essential to the competitiveness of West German exports. Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard helped drive down energy prices, pursuing a transition from coal to oil as a lower-cost option. However, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer insisted that the pain felt by the coal industry and its unionized employees be eased through state measures, setting the stage for similar interventions in later decades. Economic growth, unleashed by these policies, led to dramatic increases in carbon emissions and pollution more generally, but the leadership ignored these effects. Policymakers, who found dependence on large foreign-controlled oil corporations and the volatile Middle East disquieting, sought security through a variety of strategies. Social Democratic Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, though a strong believer in the market, pursued "mercantilist policies" (133), including a failed attempt to create a major German oil corporation with state backing; a fateful partnership with the Soviet Union in the exploitation of Siberian natural gas; and an accelerated push for nuclear power, which was to ultimately fail due to "rising costs and technocratic arrogance" (141). These policies were also driven by the desire to boost exports, create jobs, and promote détente. End Page 359 The Green Party and the environmentalist wing of the Social Democratic Party were instrumental in the emergence of a new energy paradigm, as were economists of the "Ecological Modernization" school. Unlike US economists, they tackled externalities, that is, costs not included in prices and not covered by producers, for example, when they caused pollution. Proponents argued in favor of policy levers such as taxation to promote energy-saving technologies and subsidies to promote renewable energy. Concerned with acid rain and forest die-off, the West German public was highly receptive. Opposition came mainly from within the ranks of Christian Democrats and Ordoliberals, who largely clung to the old energy paradigm. Distracted by German reunification and influenced by the hold of neoliberalism in the United States and Europe, Germany was slow to implement environmentalist measures. Nonetheless, from modest beginnings, the Eco-Institute of Freiburg pushed efficiency, while tinkerers developed wind and solar power, and the Electricity Feed-In Law of 1990 established the economic foundations for connecting these renewable energies to the grid. The Greens viewed these initiatives as part of a democratization process that they hoped would take decision-making out of the hands of the big energy corporations. Dealing with unemployment and recession, the Christian Democratic government in office (1982–1998) prioritized dealing with high energy costs, because they were concerned that these made German exports less competitive. In so doing, they undermined the. . .