Form, function, mind: what doesn’t compute (and what might)

The applicability of computational and dynamical systems models to organisms is scrutinized, using examples from developmental biology and cognition. Developmental morphogenesis is dependent on the inherent material properties of developing animal (metazoan) tissues, a non-computational modality, but cell differentiation, which utilizes chromatin-based revisable memory banks and program-like function-calling, via the developmental gene co-expression system unique to the metazoans, has a quasi-computational basis. Multi-attractor dynamical models are argued to be misapplied to global properties of development, and it is suggested that along with computationalism, classic forms of dynamicism are similarly unsuitable to accounting for cognitive phenomena. Proposals are made for treating brains and other nervous tissues as novel forms of excitable matter with inherent properties which enable the intensification of cell-based basal cognition capabilities present throughout the tree of life. Finally, some connections are drawn between the viewpoint described here and active inference models of cognition, such as the Free Energy Principle.