Adoption of Zero-Determinant Strategy in Multiplayer Prisoner's Dilemma

In any kind of counteraction amongst the people or even amongst the animals, iteration is one of the important prescriptions to preserve cooperation. When counteraction persists more long time that individuals react to the past action of their opponents, evolution can raise cooperation strategies that could not be stable in occurring only once confrontation. The power of repetition is depicted by the action of repetitive prisoner's dilemma. A group of probabilistic strategies was discovered by Press and Dyson for the game of two persons iterated prisoner's dilemma and are named zero-determinant strategy. In the framework of this study, we improve zero-determinant strategies for more than two persons iterated prisoner's dilemma games. Adoption of zero-determinant strategies can specify the coplayer's payoff in a unidirectional path, and by adopting an extortion strategy, one creates a linear relation across her own payoff and that of her coplayer's, but cannot enhance her privilege.