How intermediate government facilitates top-down policy experimentation: empirical insights from rural land marketization in Shanghai

The current paper explores the reasons behind grassroot-level local governments' unresponsive reactions in top-down policy experiments initiated by the central government. It particularly focuses on the interaction between the ambiguity of policy experimentation design and the incentive problem embedded in the power structure within institutional organizations. This examination is illustrated with a case analysis comparing two-stage performance differentials in the process of rural land marketization policy experimentation in Songjiang District, Shanghai. The findings highlight the crucial roles of intermediate governments (subnational-level or provincial-level governments) in overcoming the deadlock of policy experimentation, particularly their potential functions as policy subcontractors. By overseeing the progress and mitigating information asymmetry, intermediate governments can enhance accountability, allocate resources precisely and effectively, and apply appropriate pressures and incentives for the successful implementation of policy experimentation.