Back to the future: the persistent problems of hybrid war

Abstract What has happened to the spectre of Russian hybrid warfare that once haunted strategists, policy-makers and scholars? Many of the characteristics of Russia's 2014 invasion of Crimea have been absent in Moscow's current war, prompting some to wonder whether Russia has moved beyond ‘hybrid warfare’ as it wages a brutal conventional war in Ukraine. Scholars and practitioners should not pack up their hybrid war handbooks just yet, however. The need to limit conflict escalation between nuclear-armed adversaries suggests that non-military asymmetric tools of will increasingly define great power competition in the twenty-first century. Most urgently, scholars must bring some order to the conceptual debate over what is and is not hybrid war. In this policy paper, we propose a classification scheme that can be applied irrespective of the type of conflict, one that illuminates the wide range of political, social, economic and military weapons states may use in future conflicts. This approach not only allows us to move beyond endless debates over which tactics belong in the definition of hybrid war, but it also allows us to describe changes over time in how countries wage multi-domain wars. By describing the ‘hybridity’ of all conflict along three continuous axes of scale, militarization and centralization, scholars and policy-makers alike can avoid dangerous blind spots that are likely to arise when we try to categorize conflicts into discrete typological bins.