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To promote good corporate governance and to cope with the complex situation of rising internal corporate crime and increased risk of external sanctions, China has carried out corporate criminal compliance reform. Through a general review, it can be found that the criminal compliance reform work of enterprises has established a diversified criminal incentive model, a mechanism for linking execution and punishment with joint supervision, and different supervision and inspection standards. However, it has also encountered controversial problems. For example, the criminal incentive model lacks a reasonable basis and is insufficiently binding, the mechanism for linking the execution and punishment is insufficiently smooth and transparent, and the supervision and inspection standards are too ambiguous. In carrying out the reform of corporate criminal compliance, we should follow the logic of preventing corporate violations, giving full play to the concept of collaborative governance, and focusing on the compliance reform of the corporate business model and internal structure. In the future, we should localize the criminal incentive mechanism for corporate compliance, strengthen the mutual recognition of the results of case processing in compliance, and set up a dual standard for the formulation of compliance plans and acceptance inspections.
Shang et al. (Thu,) studied this question.
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