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Enhancing both the policy literature and institutional literature, this article uses instrumental case studies to showcase how the Supreme Court views presidential authority regarding to immigration policy. Immigration policy stems from concurrent authority between the legislature and the executive while bridging domestic and foreign affairs. I contend that the Court's position on the extent of executive authority is congruent with the "Two Presidencies Thesis" by recognizing executive authority with regard to immigration policy that involves diplomatic engagement or national security, while limiting the president on policies that do not have a direct impact on foreign policy. The first category is exemplified by immigration restrictions while the second is illustrated with the issue of deportation. On the issue of border security, the president's power appears to vary. I also argue that limitations on presidential power have resulted from procedural and administrative limitations on the more "domestic" immigration issues, which also provides evidence against the emergence of a unitary executive.
John C. Koehler (Mon,) studied this question.