Not Even Absent: Dependent Origination, Emptiness, and the Two Truths in the Thought of Nāgārjuna

Abstract As one of the most pivotal thinkers in the history Mahāyāna Buddhism, the writings of Nāgārjuna have long attracted the attention of scholars aiming to interpret in declarative terms the meaning of the arguments contained therein. However, the very aim of such an endeavor that seeks to ascribe to Nāgārjuna a philosophical position is fundamentally at odds with the unwaveringly critical nature of his project. In order to illustrate the singular character of Nāgārjuna’s methodology, this article seeks to clarify three crucial points concerning his thought: (1) the central concept in his philosophical works, dependent origination ( pratītyasamutpāda ), ironically denotes the non-origination ( anutpāda ) of any entity ( bhāva ) whatsoever and is universal in scope; (2) emptiness ( śūnyatā ) is not a meaningful predicate of any entity, meaning that no entity exists that can be identified as being empty; and (3) the Two Truths ( satyadvaya ) are not a philosophically significant device for Nāgārjuna and subsequently do not provide a means by which to mitigate the radical consequences of his arguments. As a result, we can understand Nāgārjuna’s claim to have no postulative thesis ( pratijñā ) as a statement that he predicates no quality ( dharma ) of any subject ( dharmin ), and that his methodology is strictly critical, offering us no constructive theory by which to make sense of reality.