A.A. Gromyko and Security Policy: Сonceptual Tactics of Diplomacy (to the 115th Anniversary of A.A. Gromyko)

The article deals with the role of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. A.A. Gromyko in the formation, development and maintenance of security policy, its principles and structural elements. The author explores the conceptual approaches of diplomatic tactics in the context of strategic thinking. This research is carried out on the basis of the detente project of A.A. Gromyko in 1974. Firstly, the author provides evidence that the ideas and approaches of A.A. Gromyko (the so-called Gromyko system) were approved by the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the state leadership of the USSR. Therefore, A.A. Gromyko took personal responsibility for the success of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Secondly, tactical objectives that Gromyko had to solve in 1974 are analyzed. The author highlights differences between these tasks in the first and second half of the year of negotiations. Thirdly, it is argued that Gromyko’s conditions were presented for the first time in historiography for making the conceptual compromises. Gromyko assumed that the conceptual compromises would remain for 20-30 years. Finally, the article deals with the difficulties faced by the Western partners. These difficulties (the so-called West’s trap) did not allow them to pursue a balanced policy. These difficulties also did not allow the USSR to fully implement the Gromyko system. The article is based on published documents of the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany. The author’s conclusions should be considered in the context of his earlier article in the journal.