Research on Supply Chain Contract of Omni-channel Retail with BOPS Mode

T With the rapid development of e-commerce, consumers' consumption patterns have changed, more and more consumers are used to shopping online. Therefore, in order to better connect with the consumer market and save total cost of the supply chain, more and more manufacturers have expanded their online channels, which undoubtedly has an impact on the operation of brick-and-mortar shops. Therefore, under the background of new-retail development, BOPS mode is introduced to integrate online and offline. It protects offline physical resources, and brings profit gains to different subjects of omni-channel supply chain. This paper focuses on the omni-channel supply chain members who jointly manage BOPS mode, but as different profit subjects, what kind of supply chain contracts should manufacturers and retailers adopt to guarantee their respective interests, improve the enthusiasm of each subject, and make omni-channel supply chain operate continuously. In this paper, the Stackelberg game model is used to study the influence of traditional wholesale price contract, quantity discount contract, sales rebate contract and revenue sharing contract on the profit and return of manufacturers and retailers in omni-channel supply chain, so as to effectively encourage the main body of omni-channel supply chain to actively provide BOPS, protect offline physical store resources and bring gains to omni-channel supply chain by taking advantage of online and offline advantages. It is found that sales rebate contract and revenue sharing contract can achieve Pareto optimization on the basis of traditional wholesale price contract, and the choice mainly depends on BOPS demand.