A game‐theoretic systematics of conservation and management of spatial ecosystem services

Abstract Since many ecosystem services involve spatial scales beyond farm size, their preservation and management in agricultural systems depend on the interaction of the landowners. For the analysis of such interactive land use a generic dynamic land‐use model is developed that considers different payoff structures in a systematic manner and relates land‐use dynamics to these payoff structures. A landowner's own payoff depends on the land use on neighboring land parcels. The landowners’ payoffs are interpreted in a game‐theoretic manner which allows for a game‐theoretic classification of the different land‐use dynamics generated by the model. The model is analyzed to determine the proportion, spatial aggregation and temporal turnover of land‐use measures. The model results are applied to a number of cases from literature in which the management of ecosystem services involves a regional scale, including pollinator conservation, pest control, and coordination incentives for the conservation of species in fragmented landscapes. Four main domains of model behavior are identified and related to the payoff structures (type of game), characterized by the proportions and temporal turnover of land‐use measures, and by whether the system has one or two stable equilibria. An important determinant of the land‐use dynamics is the spatial heterogeneity of the landowners' payoffs which. It affects the domain and the location in the domain by which the land‐use dynamics are characterized.