Individuals, Disaggregation of the State, and Negotiation Tactics: Evidence from the European Union

Abstract This article intends to investigate to what extent, how, and when individuals who are below the leader’s level affect the processes and outputs of international politics. It does so by analyzing one group of below-leader actors—diplomatic negotiators in EU foreign policy. It first shows how, despite all the bureaucratic layers they are embedded in, individual negotiators have de facto acquired ultimate policymaking responsibilities, most prominently in the selection of tactics. This empowerment of individual diplomats occurs through a process of double state disaggregation: Policymaking responsibilities have shifted from the political to the bureaucratic level; then, within the latter, from the capital-based administration to the officials involved, often in single capacity, in negotiations. Next, it tests three individual characteristics (experience, style, and identity) against an original dataset of 138 questionnaires completed by EU diplomats and 17 interviews. It shows that negotiators’ personal traits explain the use of some, but not all, tactics. Specifically, they are less likely to matter when negotiators have to commit the state in significant and explicit ways, e.g., when threatening/exercising veto. When this does not happen (e.g., showing flexibility in the delegation’s position or using persuasion), the influence of individual characteristics is instead strong.