In defence of a distinctively legal domain

In Law as a Moral Practice, Scott Hershovitz defends the pluralist view that there are many sets of legal norms which we can validly employ for different purposes, none of which qualifies as uniquely legal. He claims, further, that there is no set of moral rights and duties that is distinctly legal either, because the domain of morality is unified. I argue, against Hershovitz, that the existence of different sets of norms within legal practice does not mean that no set is basic, or fundamental. There is arguably one set (the actual moral rights and duties that law re-arranges) which is fundamental, and from which all the other sets are derivative. I argue, moreover, that we have strong deontological reasons to doubt that the domain of morality is unified. If political morality comprises distinct domains, not collapsible to a single moral concern, then the possibility of a distinctively legal domain of morality remains open.