Research on closed-loop supply chain decision-making of power battery echelon utilization under the scenario of trade-in

Purpose The management issues of this article, and the author is attempting to address these issues, are as follows: What is the optimal decision of each entity in the closed-loop supply chain for the cascading utilization of power batteries under three government measures: no subsidies, subsidies and rewards and punishments? How do different measures affect the process of cascading the utilization of power batteries? Which measures will help incentivize cascading utilization and battery recycling efforts? Design/methodology/approach The paper uses game analysis methods to study the optimal decisions of various stakeholders in the supply chain under the conditions of subsidies, non-subsidies and reward and punishment policies. The impact of various parameters on the returns of game entities is tested through Matlab numerical simulation. Findings The analysis discovered that each party in the supply chain will see an increase in earnings if the government boosts trade-in subsidies, which means that the degree of recycling efforts of each entity will also increase; under the condition with subsidies, the recycling efforts and echelon utilization rates of each stakeholder are higher than those under the incentive and punishment measure. In terms of the power battery echelon’s closed-loop supply chain incentive, the subsidy policy exceeds the reward and punishment policy. Originality/value The article takes the perspective of differential games and considers the dynamic process of exchanging old for new, providing important value for the practice of using old for new behavior in the closed-loop supply chain of power battery cascading utilization.