Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram beyond Face Value Political Rhetoric and Why the Governments of Somalia and Nigeria Have Failed to Tame Them

The activities of terrorist nature by the Al-Shabaab militants of Somalia and Boko Haram insurgency group of Nigeria have – in the past decade – drawn centre-stage security attention in the Greater Horn of Africa and the Sahel region. The mayhem they have caused in terms of human loss, damage to infrastructure, and stoking fear in the minds of the populations arguably makes these two groups – whose ideologies are similar – the most ferocious militant groups on the continent. This study aims to trace the underlying causal factors that facilitated the emergence of these two groups on the political scene and why they have become so operationally effective that the governments of Somalia and Nigeria have failed to tame them. Data for this study were collected and evaluated from latent literature obtained through academic journals and books, online publications, and reports from international institutions that focus on African security. The study finds that the militant's existence has adversely impacted the economic growth prospects of both countries. Thus far, there is no sign on the political horizon that suggests that their operations will cease anytime soon, – in part – because successive governments of Somalia and Nigeria have lamentably failed to resolve the national question, that is, the absence of equitable distribution of national resources, marginalization, and the lack of a genuine desire for inclusive governance. The study notes that regime ineptitude, corruption, nepotism, cronyism, and impunity have become the currency of local politics – practices that work at cross-purposes with the foundational building blocks for a stable and economically viable polity. This status quo means that checks and balances are grossly ineffective, – a consequential recipe for state failure. The study concludes that contrary to widely held notions in the political realm that ethnic and radical religious ideologies are the key driving forces behind the establishment of Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram, the real causal factors lie in the economic mismanagement by successive regimes in Nigeria and Somalia. This study advances the argument that while religion and ethnicity might play a role in the existence of the two militant groups, religious divisions are expediently used as a low hanging fruit by incompetent African regimes to cover the real reasons that lie mainly in bad governance practices. This study's exposé is vital for both the policy makers as well as for the ordinary citizens to see through this façade and focus on the root causes rather than on the effects, which is what the penchant has seemed to be.