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The Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) protocol stands as a cornerstone in modern aviation surveillance and Aircraft Traffic Control systems, integral to the NextGen project initiated by the US Department of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in 2005. ADS-B utilizes data links to autonomously broadcast Aircraft navigational and identification information to augment air transportation system capacity and safety. However, concerns regarding the protocol's security persist, particularly as its adoption expands. The unencrypted nature of transmitted aircraft data and the absence of robust authentication mechanisms render the protocol susceptible to exploitation by malicious actors. In this study, we comprehensively reviewed existing research in the field, identifying a crucial gap necessitating a holistic survey. Prior surveys have predominantly focused on specific aspects, such as vulnerabilities, attacks, or critiques of existing solutions. Our survey addresses this gap by thoroughly exploring the aviation system, providing readers with a nuanced understanding of ADS-B security. Utilizing a detailed SWOT analysis diagram, our paper delves into the vulnerabilities inherent in the ADS-B protocol outlines potential threats and scrutinizes various attack scenarios. We systematically categorize and analyze existing security solutions, considering cost-effectiveness, scalability, implementation complexity, and coverage against diverse attack vectors. Furthermore, we critically evaluate these solutions, elucidate ADS-B security requirements, discuss current challenges, and propose future research directions. This survey serves as a comprehensive resource for researchers and practitioners alike, shedding light on the multifaceted landscape of ADS-B security and paving the way for enhanced aviation system resilience in the face of evolving cybersecurity threats.
Ahmed et al. (Mon,) studied this question.