Institutional Friction and Policy Responsiveness: The Puzzle of Coalitional Fragmentation and Executive-Legislative Balance

Research on policy responsiveness to public opinion highlights differences owing to political institutions—both electoral and governmental. Electoral institutions that produce coalition governments tend to reduce responsiveness in between elections. Government institutions that divide powers horizontally, by contrast, appear to increase that responsiveness. These findings point to the role of institutional “friction” in shaping what governments do, though the two sources appear to produce different effects—one harmful and the other helpful. This paper explores this apparent contradiction. We revisit and clarify theoretical assumptions and outline alternative models of the effects of friction. Extending previous tests, now in 18 countries, we find clearer evidence supporting that earlier research and more firmly establish friction as the mechanism, particularly as regards the influence of electoral systems. The two institutional sources of friction appear to influence responsiveness in different ways, which has implications for politics and policy that we consider in the concluding section.