Key points are not available for this paper at this time.
Doklam (2017) and Galwan (2020) type of incidents on the LAC and subsequent troop buildup of 50,000 plus for the fourth consecutive year, has proved beyond doubt, that such incidents will continue to take place in future. Diplomatic and military level talks are ongoing, but, the two sticking points of Depsang and Demchok remain. There is a stalemate between both nations on border negotiations, with delineation of LAC remaining highly unlikely. War is not in the interest of either nation. However, India needs to remain prepared for long and protracted war with China, since era of short and swift wars is over. This is the lesson learnt from the Russia-Ukraine conflict that started in Feb 2022 and shows no signs of coming to an end. China’s defence budget is three times that of India and there is a wide differential between the capacities of both militaries to handle conflict. We must analyse PLA’s preparedness levels for war in Taiwan/Himalayas, along with recent transformation in its organisation and structures. PLA is not invincible and has numerous weaknesses. Indian armed forces are professional and can hold their ground in adverse situations on the LAC. However, India’s capacity to rely on its own defence industry to support war is limited. Atmanirbharta has made rapid progress, but, needs to maintain this trajectory and momentum in future. Indian Armed Forces have made transformational changes for joint, triservice integration, and need to move towards theaterisation for effective joint operations in future.
Singh et al. (Wed,) studied this question.