Key points are not available for this paper at this time.
Transparency in carbon markets is considered critical to ensure market effectiveness and public accountability. Low levels of transparency and lack of participation of non-governmental actors are persistent criticisms of Chinese (pilot) emission trading systems. Building on debates around authoritarian environmentalism and China's role therein, this article analyses transparency, manifested as information disclosure, in China's national carbon emission trading scheme (C-ETS) – the largest carbon emission market worldwide. Using expert interviews and content analysis, the article outlines practices of C-ETS information disclosure and discusses its characteristics in the context of China's environmental governance. Key findings include discrepancies both between central and provincial governments related to information disclosure, and between different provincial governments. And while most industry actors lack interest and capacity to engage in C-ETS disclosure, environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs), by contrast, are significantly more involved in the policy process and information disclosure, often as 'eco-elites'. Overall, this reveals that international and domestic ENGOs retain high-level channels to influence policy design and implementation. Yet, ENGO input is not pursued as a public good valuable for its own sake, but sought strategically as a means to the larger goal of efficient market functioning. This type of 'strategic transparency,' as we call it, suggests that China's environmental governance model – regularly considered to be a key example of authoritarian environmentalism – instead represents an evolving mixture of liberal and illiberal tactics.
Wu et al. (Sat,) studied this question.