Levinas' Concept of the Face of Others and Its Ethical Responsibility Toward Strangers

IntroductionOne of the most pressing issues that many Western countries have been grappling with is migration. In recent years, we have observed a significant number of refugees arriving from various countries, including Venezuela, Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq. Nevertheless, we are also confronted with complicated responses to migrants and refugees, who are strangers who are attempting to cross borders with much uncertainty in order to establish a better life than the one they had in their home countries. We have encountered an infinite number of stories that show both hospitality and hostility. According to all philosophers, our moral stance toward others is determined by how we treat others in the context of the migratory situation, which involves the reception of strangers. In this paper, I suggest a genuine method of engaging with the Other from Levinas' perspective. It is an ethical obligation to migrants. This paper is structured into four sections. In the first section, I scrutinize Levinas' concept of the face and its significance throughout his works. Then, I will delineate Levinas' ethical responsibility to others with two characteristics – infinity and asymmetrical - based on the concept of the face of the other in the section section. In the third section, I contend that the migrant, refugee, and asylum seekers at the border of many countries today are the face of the other in Levinas' account. In section four, I demonstrate the responsibility under certain conditions or policies that many countries in Europe and North America adopted to prevent or limit from arriving and seeking sanctuary is not the solution to the current refugee crisis by raising some problems from this point of view. Simultaneously, I assert that Levinas' ethical responsibility, which is infinite and unlimited responsibility, is the true attitude toward strangers. I propose some principles we should follow when encountering migrants that are extracted from the concept of face and responsibility. To conclude, I argue that Levinas' ethical responsibility to strangers is the genuine hospitality we must exhibit when engaging with others. Moreover, Levinas' ethical obligation to strangers is a promising resolution to the refugee crisis.Levinas' concept of the face and its significanceThe face of the other is the most crucial concept in Levinas' thought and ethics. What does it mean in the context of Levinas? In his first major work, Totality and Infinity: Essay on Exteriority, Levinas asserts that "face" refers to the human face and is not an idea to be perceived or experienced as a physical or aesthetic object. "The face is a living presence. The life of expression consists in undoing the form in which the existent, exposed as a theme, is thereby dissimulated. The face speaks" (Levinas, 1969, p. 66). In this passage, Levinas contends that the face is the living presence that implies the existence of another individual. People who are capable of communicating with me are considered to be living presences. In other words, the living presence is revealed to me and communicates through expressions that are exclusive to the other person. In fact, Levinas argues that the living presence or the face cannot be a thing or an object, and we cannot reduce the face or the living presence (another person) to images or ideas in our minds. He states, "To think the infinite, the transcendent, the Stranger, is hence not to think an object" (ibid, p. 49). Consequently, our interactions with others are fundamentally distinct from our interactions with any other object in the world (Zahavi et al., 2020, p. 83). Levinas maintains that there are numerous objects or entities around us that are distinct from ourselves. By utilizing or consuming these objects, I assimilate their distinctiveness into something familiar and identical to myself, causing them to lose their inherent otherness. For example, when I consume a piece of bread, the bread's characteristics and distinctions undergo a transformation within my body, rendering the bread no longer in existence (Levinas, 1969, pp. 110-111; 119). My interaction with the object assimilates the unfamiliar, nullifies its difference, and unites them into one. According to Zahavi et al. (2020), when I perceive objects, I am the condition that allows them to become visible (p.84).In contrast, my encounter with the other – the living presence is not conditioned or dependent on myself. The other cannot be conceptualized or categorized as things. Levinas insists that the other is irreducibility to a finite (bounded) entity over which I can have power, which is revealed by the impossibility of capturing the other conceptually or otherwise – the other's infinity: "If one could possess, grasp, and know the other, it would not be other" (Levinas, 1987, p. 90). In contrast to Buber's concept of the I-thou relationship, which involves mutual recognition and interaction between active and passive roles, Levinas argues that the encounter with the other, or the face-to-face encounter, is characterized by an asymmetrical and passive relationship influenced by an "invisible" factor – the Other (ibid., 68, 86).In other passages, Levinas clearly posits that the concept of the face is the other when he mentions the relationship between the subject and the other that the subject encounters:The way in which the other presents himself, exceeding the idea of the other in me, we here name face. This mode does not consist in figuring as a theme under my gaze, in spreading itself forth as a set of qualities forming an image (Levinas, 1969, p. 50).Thence the importance of the relation to the other man as the incomparable, as emptied of all "social role," and who thus, in his nudity—his destitution, his mortality—straightaway imposes himself upon my responsibility: goodness, mercy, or charity. This nudity which is a call to me—an appeal but also an imperative—I name face(Robbins, 2001, pp. 114-115).Levinas argues that the face, as a representation of the other person, can be revealed and communicated not only through the physical face itself, but also through speech, gestures, actions, and overall bodily presence. However, the face is also the most vulnerable, exposed, and expressive part of the other person's presence. No one ever sees the other person's face. This is more than I can think of.The other person speaks with me by urging me to take action on their behalf, as they are the ones who are without clothes, impoverished, and facing imminent death. They stand before me and expect a reaction: "The face opens the primordial discourse whose first word is obligation" (Levinas, 1969, p. 201). We cannot do nothing when we look the other in the eye. The look of the other demands a gesture (Herrmann, 2017, p. 84). In various sections of his writings, Levinas discusses the concept of an obligation that necessitates individuals to assume responsibility for others. In his work Totality and Infinity , Levinas asserts that "…the face presents itself, and demands justice" (Levinas, 1969, p. 294). In another passage, he asserts that "I am not free to ignore the meaningful world into which the face of the Other has introduced me (ibid., p. 219). In Difficult Freedom: Essay on Judaism, Levinas articulates the idea that "In front of the face, I always demand more of myself; the more I respond to it, the more the demands grow" (Levinas, 1990, p. 294). Levinas, according to Zahavi (2020), does not accept the demand from the other to be responsible for the other as an active and voluntary choice. Rather, it is a passive action that is imposed upon me by the other person (p. 84): "Since the Other looks at me, I am responsible for him, without even havingtaken on responsibilities in his regard; his responsibilityis incumbent on me. It is the responsibility that goes beyond what I do" (Levinas, 1985, p. 96). Levinas's interpretation of responsibility is that it signifies an original being-for-the-other and occurs prior to one's actions and decisions (ibid.).Ethical responsibility to others: infinite and asymmetry responsibilityAs previously stated, the countenance of the other person represents an imperative that necessitates my response. Levinas considers it a demand or a duty. I am indebted to the other person for this responsibility, and I should not have any expectations of them: "The Other imposes himself as an exigency" (ibid., p. 87). How does Levinas define the term "affected by this demand"? According to Levinas, this responsibility – the demand has two dimensions that are infinity and asymmetry: "This responsibility is established neither beneath the simultaneity of the givens of knowledge, contemporary for the gaze which apprehends everything nor in the reciprocity of exchanges within economic society" (Robbins, 2001, p. 118). In other words, responsibility cannot be understood as a given of knowledge that we can perceive by our gaze that apprehends everything. The face of the other is not an object of knowledge. The face is something transcendental – infinity, which is always outside the grasp of seeing. On the other hand, responsibility is not a two-way exchange between me and the other – reciprocal. It is a one-sided reciprocal. The responsibility to the Other is symmetrical: "Responsibility, the signification which is non-indifference, goes one way, from me to the other" (Levinas, 1998a, p. 138).The infinite responsibility to the otherIn his Essay Totality and Infinity , Levinas posits that the responsibility for the Other is infinite (1969, p. 244). The infinity of responsibility to the Other can be understood in two meanings. The first meaning is about a responsibility without conditions or responsibility that is unconditioned. The second meaning involves the unlimited or unending aspect of the infinity of responsibility. Levinas elucidates the infinite responsibility associated with the Other by drawing attention to the transcendent value of the Other and the primacy of personal encounters. Founded on the transcendence and vulnerability of the Other, the responsibility to the Other becomes an obligation that is unconditional and limitless. Prior to any rational deliberation, freedom, or choice, it establishes the basis of ethical subjectivity.This response answers, before any understanding, for a debt contracted before any freedom and before any consciousness and any present, but it does answer, as though the invisible that bypasses the present left a trace by the very fact of bypassing the present (Levinas, 1998a, p. 12).In Levinas's view, responsibility is infinite or unconditional since it arises immediately when we encounter the Other. In a "face-to-face" relationship, we are responsible for the Other even though we do not know anything about the Other. We have to do something for the Other whenever they approach us. We are obligated to provide sustenance to the Other if they are hungry, to clothe them if they are naked, and to address any other needs they may have. It is important to remember that these needs are sacred - the other bears a strong resemblance to what might be considered sacred - because they are the needs of our neighbors. This idea aligns with Derrida's account of unconditional hospitality in which the host, without any conditions, does not ask the guest to give back anything or identity themselves. We can say that our responsibility to the Other is an unconditioned responsibility11According to Derrida (1999, 2000, 2002, 2005), there are two kinds of hospitality: conditional hospitality and unconditional hospitality. The conditional hospitality of invitation, which subjects the stranger to customs and policies - legal requirements, social norms, or personal expectations. On the one hand, there is a law of unlimited hospitality that commands the unconditional or absolute reception of the stranger. or unlimited responsibility. We have to answer for something to somebody without any conditions.The unconditioned responsibility can be broadly understood from the perspective of the ethical act of responsibility toward the Other and of any philosophical discourse. This ethical act explains that responsibility toward the Other precedes our freedom and choices in a more fundamental sense. Responsibility is the cornerstone of our subjectivity and an indispensable component of our existence. "We must carry each other. If we don't have this, what are we . . ." (Michaels, 1997, p. 14). Levinas contends that the obligation to the Other is derived at a pre-reflective level, prior to any conscious thought or decision. This implies that the ethical responsibility is immediately felt upon recognizing the Other's face, without the necessity for rational deliberation or justification. Moreover, he argues that freedom is not for oneself, but rather for the Other: "The present is a beginning in my freedom, whereas the Good is not presented to freedom; it has chosen me before I have chosen it" (1998, p. 11), and Levinas asserts that "No one is good voluntarily." Consequently, Levinas' ethic is not founded on the rights and responsibilities of the individual who is free to choose (actively), but rather on an embodied dimension (the other person) that exists prior to this. The response to a call – the face of the Other is not reasoning by oneself – the ego, as he states: "It is a reason before the beginning, before any present, for my responsibility for the other commands me before any decision, any deliberation" (ibid., p. 166).Along with the unconditioned aspect of responsibility, Levinas also emphasizes the unlimited or unending notion of responsibility. This means that there is no end to the responsibility, and this responsibility will never be completely fulfilled. It covers the Other's needs in their entirety, from the most fundamental material demands to more nuanced existential ones. Because the ethical demand is infinite, this duty never ends and grows in proportion to its satisfaction. In his work "Totality and Infinity ," Levinas argues that the notion of responsibility is boundless or incomplete, as it perpetually grows and expands over time:The infinity of responsibility denotes not its actual immensity, a responsibility increasing in the measure that it is assumed; duty becomes greater in the measure that they are accomplished. The better I accomplish my duty the fewer rights I have; the more I am just the more guilty I am (1969, p. 244) (italics is original words).To better understand the boundless aspect of responsibility, it is necessary to examine the two characteristics of the fact that I discussed in the first section: the uniqueness of the Other and the transcendence of the Other. The uniqueness of the Other is the essence of infinite responsibility. According to Levinas, the Otherness or the neighbor is not something that we can measure or 'grasp' or 'embrace.' In one interview, Levinas states that "the absolutely other (that is, uniqueness of the unique), is not a failed coincidence and would not have ended in some sublime projected goal, nor in the incomprehension of what should have been grasped and understood as an object, as "my thing" (Robbins, 2001, p. 242). The Other is an absolute alterity or otherness that is either beyond our comprehension or beyond our grasp. Therefore, our responsibility toward the Other is infinite and unending due to the ungraspable nature of their uniqueness. The Other is not only uniqueness, but is also infinite in Levinas' account. The Other is not limited to any totalities or categories we might try to put them into. Levinas uses Descartes' idea of God's infinity to show how the Other is both limitless and above all else, which leads to an infinite moral response:"the alterity of the infinite is not cancelled, is not extinguished in the thought that thinks it. In thinking infinity the I from the firstthinks more than it thinks. Infinity does not enter into theidea of infinity, is not grasped; this idea is not a concept. The infinite is the radically, absolutely, other" (Levinas, 1987a, p. 54).As the Other is unique, incomprehensible, and infinite in their alterity, our obligation to them is also boundless. In essence, Levinas contends that the ethical demand is never fully met or satisfied due to the infinite nature of the Other. Our responsibility is infinite due to the unending nature of the ethical response to the Other's irreducible alterity and transcendence.The responsibility for the Other is asymmetrical.One of the most important characteristics of responsibility is that it signifies an original being for the other. It is not something that I could expect from the Other. Responsibility is a call from the Other. In other words, it is a response from oneself to the Other. Levinas confirms this idea throughout his works. In Ethics and Infinity, Levinas says, "I am responsible for the Other without waiting for his reciprocity, were I to die for it. Reciprocity is his affair" (1985, p. 96). With the same meaning, in Totality and Infinity, Levinas states, "responsibility for the other, for what has not begun in me" (1969, p. 125). In these words, Levinas explicitly asserts that responsibility is not reciprocal, but it is one-sided. "Responsibility, the signification which is non-indifference, goes one way, from me to the other" (Levinas, 185, p. 98). This one-sided aspect of responsibility in Levivas' account marks the difference in the view of relation I-Other between Levinas and Buber. For Buber, the most fundamental relation between the self and the other is the I-Thou relation, in which both sides (oneself and the other) are equal and reciprocal, relating to each other. Conversely, Levinas maintains that the fundamental relationship between the self and the other is one-sided or non-reciprocal (Zahavi, 2020, p. 87). In Levinas' account, the relationship between the self and the other "does not imply reciprocity" (1964, p. 24), or it is a relation of "ethical inequality" of "subordinate to the other" (1994, p. 64). Levinas contends that whenever I do something for the other in expectation of reciprocity, the relationship ceases to be characterized by generosity and becomes a commercial relationship involving the exchange of good behavior. Thus, according to Levinas, Buber's I-Thou relation is considered a "reciprocal and symmetrical (relation), thus committing violence against height (the other)" (Derrida, 2007, 131 footnote 37). On the contrary, Levinas concludes, "in relation to the other, the other appears to me as one to whom I owe something, toward whom I have a responsibility. Hence the asymmetry of the I-You relation and the radical inequality between the I and you, for all relation to the other is a relation to a being toward whom I have obligations" (Levinas, 1999, p. 101).It is necessary to discuss the two possible distinct ways of explanation of the one-sided relationship. On one hand, the other is a person who is inferior or less capable. Conversely, the other individual occupies a position that surpasses mine. Although Levinas emphasizes that the Other is the one who is vulnerable and defenseless in relation to me, who is the rich and powerful (Levinas, 1987, p. 83), the Other is not the weaker. On the contrary, Lenivas emphasizes that the other is a calling from a height. In other words, the other does not come from below as the weaker but from above (Zahavi, 2020, p. 85). Indeed, in the relation between the self and the other, I have to respond to the call of the other as an unconditional responsibility for the other, as Jankélévitch states: "We don't have any right; it is always the other who has rights" (quoted in Levinas, 1999, p. 102). In this asymmetry, the self responds to the Other by stating, "I am your hostage" or "Here I am."The face of the stranger: immigrants, refugees and asylum seekersHere, it is important to note that, according to Levinas, the concept of the face of the other is not their physical appearance, but precisely noteworthy that the face of the other is invisible. In addition, Levinas characterizes the face of the Other as a pure expression of vulnerability, defenselessness, and nudity, rather than a physical feature that can be conceptualized. This vulnerability is crucial for the ethical encounter, as it disrupts the normal flow of life and places an ethical obligation on the self. Levinas frequently mentions the face of the other – the vulnerable people, such as the weak or the poor, such as orphans, widows, and the impoverished and hungry (1987b, p. 83). In its defenselessness and vulnerability, the face immediately conveys an ethical imperative. It silently requires the self to act with compassion and care, emphasizing the inherent fragility of the Other and the ethical obligation to provide them with protection and support. In other words, the other, as "an orphan, widow and poor," claims (call for responsibility) me with his poverty, nakedness, and suffering, not with his logic, cultural traditions, or economic or political power (Bernet, 2000, p.52). This definition of the face of Levinas and its attributes contributes to different real-life applications. One of the important ones is understanding and finding a solution to the current issue: the migration crisis. Who are migrants22In this paper, the terms strangers include immigrants, migrants, refugees, and asylees. Migrant and immigrant are commonly used interchangeably.?The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) defines a migrant as "any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person's legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is"33https://meaningofmigrants.org/, accessed July 20, 2024.. To put it simply, migrants are individuals who are constantly seeking new places to settle in different push factors such as violence, injustice, and war, weak states, significant tensions, particularly within the Islamic world, demographic imbalances, external political interference that induce social discomfort, poverty and corruption, land grabs, lack of employment opportunities, and even ecological factors like severe weather (Sultana, 2017, pp. 51-52). Many of them are asylum seekers and refugees, as they are seeking protection from persecution or serious harm in a country other than their own and are awaiting a decision on their application for refugee status under applicable international and national instruments. Some of them are not persecuted, but they (immigrants) attempt to flee their desperate circumstances, and then millions will endeavor to leave behind their misery in order to pursue a decent life in another location (ibid.). They all escape from their countries without any guarantee - no assets, security, or identification- and they are uncertain about their destination and whether they will be able to reach it. Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, has resulted in the displacement of over 8 million Ukrainian refugees throughout Europe and over 5 million people within Ukraine. After the Taliban regained control of Afghanistan, and millions of individuals fled the country in 2021 to seek refuge in other nations44https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58283177, accessed July 20, 2024.. Over one million individuals attempted the perilous journey to Europe in 2015. Many of them attempted to cross the ocean between Turkey and Greece. Sadly, out of the total, 2,443 individuals cannot reach their intended location55https://www.iom.int/news/mediterranean-migrant-arrivals-2016-204311-deaths-2443, accessed July 20, 2024.. Many of them arrive in the new location without their families, including their spouses, children, and parents. In the new country - the foreign land - migrants are the orphans, the weak, and the poor, the strangers. Given the preceding conversation, we can now infer that immigrants and refugees, who are seen as unfamiliar individuals, exemplify the notion of "the other" in Levinas' theory. This concept highlights the importance of recognizing and dealing with their defenselessness and vulnerability.Do we have an ethical responsibility toward the stranger?According to Derrida (2000), there are two ways to respond to migrants (immigrants and refugees): conditioned and unconditioned hospitality. The former is used to identify who will be admitted with some policies or criteria, and the latter chooses to accept everyone who comes to the host without any conditions. In recent years, much attention has been paid to the idea of welcoming others into one's home and country. We have heard many stories of both hostility and kindness. Should we open or shut the door when we meet someone we do not know?In this section, I contend that the face of the stranger, as refugees and immigrants, must be treated as the Other with infinite and unlimited responsibility, as unconditioned hospitality, rather than under policies and conditions as conditioned hospitality. This unconditioned responsibility to the Other is central to Levinas' perspective and the preceding sections. Concurrently, I will present some critiques of contemporary ethics in political practice and social contexts in relation to the current migration crisis.Responsibility to strangers under certain conditionsIn recent years, especially after the terrorism of 9/11, refugees and immigrants have found that it is much harder to gain entry to countries in Europe and North America. These countries still receive migrants under certain conditions. In other words, these countries contend that the strangers are welcoming, but they are subjected to customs and policy checks. In Derrida's perspective, this form of hospitality is known as conditional hospitality. This form of hospitality implies that a right should be granted under specific circumstances. From the perspective of conditional hospitality, the visitor is well-received and is primarily a foreigner; therefore, it is appropriate for him to remain in that condition. Derrida asserts that the host is "master in his house, in his household, in his state, in his nations, in his city, in his town…(he) who defines the conditions of hospitality or welcome" (Derrida 2000: 4). The host is responsible for the threshold and the border, and he desires to maintain control while welcoming the visitor (Derrida 1999: 69). A guest is welcomed as a friend, provided that the host maintains his or her own authority in their home or country. The host ultimately exercises the right to select who enters, as the right to visitation is conditional. The guest's acceptance as a guest is contingent upon the fulfillment of the specified conditions. He is prohibited from entering the host's residence, or he may enter only illegally (Trinh, 2023). This kind of hospitality is applied to tightening restrictions on refugees and asylum seekers entering many countries worldwide.According to the International Rescue Committee (2021), in the last few years, refugee protections have been weakened in Europe and the U.S. More and more states are detaining, intimidating, and denying refugees their right to asylum, even through illegal pushbacks (p. 1). In European countries, many policies are used to reduce the number of migrants by practicing stricter border management that keeps migrants from trying to move so that they decide to return to their home countries. Migrants are frequently compelled to enter border zones, where they are commonly subjected to confinement, violent behavior, pushbacks, deportation, and other cruelties (Levine, 2024, p. 103). On July 20, 2023, the U.K. Parliament approved the Illegal Migration Act 2023, which narrowed and limited many migrants' rights, especially those without documents. Under this Act, migrants who enter the United Kingdom unlawfully (undocumented) will be prohibited from remaining in the country. Instead, they will be detained and deported to their home or a secure third country (The Illegal Migration Act 2023, introduction).The U.S., a nation that has been known as the nation welcoming of immigration until now, also has many new policies and administrative arrangements to control, limit, and turn migrants away, such as the construction of border fences, applying Title 42. In his book The Ethics of Immigration, Carens contends that there are two kinds of criteria that migrants could be excluded from the U.S.: the criteria of exclusion and the criteria of selection. The criteria for exclusion of migrants based on race, ethnicity, religion, the use of sexual orientation, criminal records, and health condition (health risk) is a criterion of exclusion in immigration policy (Carens, 2013, pp. 174-177). On the other hand, States often use family ties, ethnic ties, linguistic competence, and potential economic as criteria for selection (ibid., pp. 179-185). With these policies and criteria, States want to decide which immigrants to admit or morally permissible to enter the country. Moreover, Levine (2024) asserts that the maximum number of refugees that could enter the country was significantly reduced during the Trump administration. This was achieved by imposing new security selection procedures on refugees prior to admission, which resulted in significantly extended waiting times and left many refugees in dangerous situations for extended periods. During this time, the dozens of policies and procedures that that administration implemented slowed or even halted legal immigration (p. 106).These attitudes are the traditional host-guest relationship, which often places conditions on the guest – migrants. This relationship is based on correlation, reciprocity, and equality. In this relation, the Other is not welcomed by the host since they cannot satisfy the