Bridge the marriage divide, don't accept it

There is no longer any question that men, women, children, and even communities are better off, on average, when marriage grounds and guides the context of family life (Kearney, 2023; Wilcox, 2024). In communities and households where marriage is the norm, for instance, the American Dream is stronger (Chetty et al. 2014; Wilcox, 2024), rates of child poverty are lower and college graduation higher (Kearney, 2023; Wilcox et al., 2015), and adult deaths of despair and financial distress are markedly less common (Rothwell, 2024; Wilcox, 2024). Given this, how can one argue against public policies designed to strengthen the institution of marriage? Most of the outcomes associated with marriage are actually "selection effects" where beneficial outcomes associated with marriage actually flow from other factors correlated with but not caused by marriage; Any genuine effects attributable to marriage do not benefit less advantaged and Black Americans as much they do more advantaged Americans; There are not enough marriageable men on hand to justify promoting marriage; and, therefore, The state should "look beyond marriage" in aiming for policies to support children and families. We are not persuaded by Professor Fomby's points. We explain why below. There is no doubt, given the ways in which marriage is now more common among, for instance, more affluent and religious Americans (Wilcox, 2024) that some of the evident benefits of marriage for children and adults actually flow from the "multiple forms of capital that married families accumulate and effectively deploy" in their lives, as Fomby contends. But the effects of what Harvard anthropologist Joseph Henrich (2020) called our "primeval institution" are not likely to be entirely about selection. The values, norms, and customs of marriage—which have guided family relationships in civilizations across the globe—lend meaning, direction, and stability to individual and family lives. They also allow for unparalleled financial collaboration and security. All of which appear to have a protective impact on the well-being of children and adults that is causal (Wilcox, 2024). The most sophisticated social scientific evidence regarding marriage is consistent with the conclusion that marriage's effects are not just about selection but also about protection. One study of Minnesota identical male twins found, for instance, that married twins earn about 26% more than their identical twins who are not married (Bouchard et al., 1990). Another twin study by psychologist Brian D'Onofrio and colleagues (2005) found results "consistent with a causal connection between marital instability and psychopathology in young-adult offspring" of mothers who were twins but discordant on divorce (p. 570). Studies like these strongly suggest that pre-existing biological or social factors do not entirely account for the effects of marriage on children and adults. As with other core institutions—like colleges and universities—the values, norms, and customs deployed by the institution of marriage appear to influence men, women, children, and the communities in which they live—generally for the good. In the last 50 years, a large marriage divide has emerged in America such that lower-income and Black Americans are markedly less likely to get and stay married. Fomby argues that we should make our peace with this divide since, by her account, these groups do not benefit as much from marriage on some outcomes as other Americans: "Increasing marriage rates in population subgroups that benefit less from marriage without redressing other causes of inequality is unlikely to close racial and social class gaps in family resources or child outcomes." But she overlooks evidence contrary to her thesis. Sociologist John Iceland's (2019) research indicated that the biggest factor accounting for the racial divide in poverty and affluence now is "family structure… explaining about a third of the disparity in poverty and affluence" (p. 641); moreover, the predictive power of family structure has grown in recent decades. Likewise, economists Melissa Kearney and Philip Levine (2017) reported that while the benefit of coming from a married home when it comes to getting a college education and earning a lot of money is bigger for kids from more advantaged homes, as Fomby might predict, it is bigger for children from less advantaged homes when it comes to their odds of avoiding poverty and dropping out of high school. Work like this indicates that Fomby is not telling us the whole story about marriage, race, and advantage in America. For some important outcomes, marriage clearly appears to matter a great deal for the welfare of Black and less advantaged Americans. This research also suggests that our goal should be to bridge the marriage divide, not accept it. Bridging the marriage divide would bridge racial gaps in poverty, affluence, and educational attainment—and do the same for children raised in less advantaged homes. This is why we should all be working for a day where all Americans have equal access to this foundational institution regardless of their race, education, or income. Moreover, Fomby seems to assert that pursuing policies to strengthen the institution of marriage and make it more accessible to all must be done "without addressing other causes of inequality." This approach assumes an either/or logic rather than a both/and approach to addressing inequality. By contrast, we think that policymakers should work to both eliminate marriage inequality and other forms of injustice. In speaking to a wide range of young women for my (Wilcox) book Get Married (2024), I heard many of them express concern about the quality of men in their social circles. Fomby makes a similar point, arguing that many young adults today are not "marriageable," falling "short on characteristics like employability." This is a fair point and a real challenge facing our society today. Full-time employment among prime-aged men, for instance, has fallen in recent decades, reducing men's marriageability (Wilcox, 2024). But why are so many young men not measuring up for dating and marriage today? One reason is the breakdown of marriage. Young men from non-intact families are about half as likely to graduate from college and twice as likely to land in prison; they are also significantly "more likely to end up idle, to work less, and to earn less money if they came from a non-intact family" (Wilcox, 2024, p. 73). This means accepting low levels of marriage and family stability in less-advantaged communities, as Fomby and other scholars (Reeves, 2022) seem inclined to do, will only lock in this problem for young men raised in communities where marriage has grown fragile. If we are serious about tackling the issue of male marriageability, then, we also need to get serious about strengthening marriage in communities where this core institution is currently weak. Again, a both/and, bi-directional policy approach is needed here. Given her perspective, Fomby would like us to "look beyond marriage." But the research suggests that marriage plays a central role in advancing the welfare of children, men, women, and the communities in which they live. What's more: we know from the U.S. military's experience with marriage that government policies and institutions that lend cultural and financial support to marriage can substantially increase rates of marriage among Black and less advantaged Americans (Lundquist, 2004). Accordingly, we think policymakers should look to a range of new policies to strengthen our most important social institution: marriage. W. Bradford Wilcox is Professor of Sociology at University of Virginia and Director of the National Marriage Project, 201 Randall Hall, Department of Sociology, UVA, Charlottesville, VA 22904 (email: email protected). Alan J. Hawkins is Emeritus Professor of Family Life at Brigham Young University, 734 Hillsdale Lane, Provo, UT 84606 (email: email protected).