Research on Multi-round First-price Sealed Bidding Strategy Based on Bidders' Incomplete Information Game

Bidding mechanisms are essential for the market and policies because bidding patterns have an impact on economic rationality and are crucial for the functioning of the construction industry. Thus, this paper consolidates the findings from the multiple rounds of combinatorial auctions, the winners curse in incomplete information auctions, and game theory. There is no doubt that bidding mechanisms play an important role in markets and policies in economic activities. This paper's related topics of interest would be multi-round combinatorial auctions, winners curses in project bidding, and game theory in incompletely informed auctions. This paper reviews the literature and employs the models based on the Nash equilibrium. There are many types of bidding strategies such as first, second, and successive bid bidding strategies, cooperative bidding, non-cooperative bidding, and how information asymmetry plays a critical role in these strategies. As mentioned before, criterion-based adaptive bidding strategies are not sensitive to market conditions and can provide near-optimal solutions. In the same way, iterative learning also prevents the occurrence of the winners curse in the multi-stage bidding context. UK auctions are seen as more efficient relative to other locations because information costs are lower, while game-theory-based strategies improve mechanisms for obtaining tasks and cost optimization in mobile crowdsourcing tasks. The use of electronic auctions can help a market become more fully rational and efficient. The methodology of game theory helps explain the outcomes of auctioning and emphasizes innovations in automation as well as policies. Therefore, this paper's implications are significant to the current and ongoing literature on efficiency, strategic behaviour, and policy in bidding mechanisms across different markets.