Conflict of Command: George McClellan, Abraham Lincoln, and the Politics of War by George C. Rable (review)

Reviewed by: Conflict of Command: George McClellan, Abraham Lincoln, and the Politics of War by George C. Rable Jennifer M. Murray (bio) Conflict of Command: George McClellan, Abraham Lincoln, and the Politics of War. By George C. Rable. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2023. Pp. 496. Cloth, 49. 95. ) The relationship between President Abraham Lincoln and Major General George B. McClellan is one of the most influential and important, if ultimately unproductive, of the American Civil War. Studies on Lincoln abound, including several on his efficacy as commander in chief, and a smattering of historians have offered biographical treatments of McClellan, which invariably discuss the general's fractured relationship with the president. More specifically, John Waugh's Lincoln and McClellan: The Troubled Partnership between a President and His General (2010) offers a modern treatment of the dynamic between these two men. Few generals in American history have been reduced to predictable straw men in ways comparable to George McClellan. Indeed, the very mention of "Little Mac" to Civil War audiences is often met with laughter or derision— and, at times, with good reason. Appointed a major general at thirty-four, McClellan proved to be a military commander afflicted with the "slows" who, after the Antietam campaign, left Lincoln no choice but to shelve End Page 382 him. Thus, successfully untangling this complicated civil-military relationship is no easy task and requires a judicious review of the primary research and, above all, objectivity. In Conflict of Command, George Rable, professor emeritus at the University of Alabama, tackles the relationship between Lincoln and McClellan and offers a refreshingly balanced interpretation of both men. Intentionally avoiding the temptation to rehash the tactical minutia of McClellan's campaigns, Rable focuses on the politics of the Lincoln-McClellan relationship. Rable casts McClellan as more than Lincoln's antagonist and demonstrates how the dynamic between the president and his general evolved and how politicians and journalists—shapers of public opinion—influenced civil-military relations. The greatest strength of Rable's study is his objective treatment of both Lincoln and McClellan. Lincoln, as Rable demonstrates, grew in his position as commander in chief and at times struggled in his new role. For instance, Lincoln allowed his generals to bypass the chain of command. The president's evolving views on the prosecution of the war shifted from a policy of conciliation, which included the protection of southern civilian property, to an embrace of a hard-war policy. More significantly, Lincoln came to believe that emancipation was an imperative. McClellan, by contrast, was an antebellum army officer wedded to a fundamentally conservative prosecution of the war and failed to embrace emancipation as a wartime objective. Rable tackles McClellan with nuance. Few of McClellan's contemporaries doubted his ability to build an army, but the general's refusal to share the details of his operational plans with the administration, his difficulties in working with Winfield Scott, and his reluctance to advance the Army of the Potomac quickly led to skepticism, particularly among the Radical Republicans. By the fall of 1861, Lincoln and McClellan had come to "view the other warily" (77). Lincoln appeared frequently at McClellan's headquarters, often to the irritation of the general. In the wake of the failed Peninsula campaign, calls for McClellan's removal increased, but, although relations between Lincoln and McClellan had "clearly soured" (191), the general retained his position. "Whether the president should have left McClellan on the Peninsula to launch another thrust at Richmond is a question without easy answers, " Rable explains, "but it would be another two years before a Federal army would be that close to the Confederate capital" (205). Still, McClellan's supporters remained loyal to the general. They explained Federal setbacks by accusing the Lincoln administration of withholding troops and failing to adequately supply the army. The adoration of McClellan by the men in the Army of the Potomac has been well End Page 383 documented, but those bonds of affection "showed signs of strain" after the Battle of Antietam (241). On November 5, 1862, the day after the midterm elections, Lincoln relieved McClellan of command and appointed Major General Ambrose Burnside as his successor. Some within the. . .