From history of physics to “history for physics”

On history of physicsAll human activity has a history.This can be understood in the straightforward sense that there exists a past in which things were and happened differently and which can be studied for its own intrinsic value.In addition, we can take the position that our past has conditioned our present in various ways and that the traces we can still find of that past therefore hold valuable keys to a better understanding of our present activities.If we further assume that physics is not just the current state of our physical theories, but is itself a human activity-a social and intellectual practice that produces these theories-we can use historical analysis as an epistemological tool for a better understanding of these theories.The study of history, especially the history of science and in particular the history of physics, can take many different forms-one of the beauties and strengths of the field.The particular approach to history we advocate here is one that we see as complementary to physical reasoning.Its epistemological focus concerns physics itself: its theories as well as its practice.For this reason, our target audience encompasses not only historians of physics but also physicists themselves.To clarify, we consider any legitimate history of physics to be necessarily independent of any attempt at instrumentalization from within the field of physics itself.Examples of such instrumentalization include the distortion of historical narratives in order to legitimize current research programs or the presentation of supposedly historically informed scientific views.Another example is the overemphasis on the contributions of certain individuals (or groups) to the effect of erasing others.Additionally, determining what counts as an interesting historical question should, of course, not be dictated by current trends within physics.Thus, while we see our epistemological aim as complementary to, and in some sense intertwined with, physics, the history of physics must remain an intellectually independent endeavor.Nevertheless, we maintain that the history of physics should inherently address the implications of contemporary physics.This is because historical analyses allow for critical engagement and independent logical analysis based on factual evidence, which can be extremely useful in clarifying fundamental conceptual and programmatic issues.Unlike a philosopher, who might ask, "What ought to exist?" in a normative sense, a historian asks, "What has existed?" and "How did it develop into what it is now?" in an empirically informed sense.On this basis, we are then free to draw conclusions about how historical knowledge enhances our understanding of contemporary theories.On a more personal level, it can be challenging to quantify the internal transformative power of discovering a previously unknown, and possibly surprising, historical origin of a theory, concept, or debate.Or, the moment of enlightenment when one realizes that a familiar concept has not always been that way, but that it has been changed by all kinds of influences over time.Or that a concept that has always seemed odd to oneself has actually been debated since it was first introduced, highlighting that concepts within science are in fact not free of human value judgements.These kinds of insights shift our perspective on what is perceived as eternally given and externally determined, and what, in turn, can be seen as historically contingent and thus open to critique and rethinking.In this sense, the practice of history can be empowering.It can restore agency to the individual researcher within the highly specialized and formally as well as programmatically determined enterprise of contemporary physics.This is particularly true for technically informed history, where an engagement with the technical details allows for