Evolution Isn’t Teleological, Writing About it Is

Some critics hold that all talk of functions, purposes, goals, and intentions should be outlawed in biology: they are teleological notions and therefore misleading or inappropriate. But it is difficult to write non-teleologically about evolution (or anything) because language and narrative are suffused with agency and intent and therefore teleology. I offer a reading of several works of colloquial science to illustrate the various conceptions of teleology in biology and the futility of trying to purge discourse of teleological framings. In natural language, the subject–object constituents and certain features of verbs carry connotations of intent even when they describe a mindless process, such as natural selection. Narrative, meanwhile, works by implying that agents (with goals) are what weave together the unspecified connections between events. Combined, the constraints of language and narrative guarantee that authors will be accused of teleology even while arguing, often convincingly, against teleology in evolution.