Moral Psychology and Utilitarianism

According to utilitarianism, we should improve the lives of humans and other sentient beings as much as possible. As an abstract ideal, utilitarianism has a natural appeal and may even sound like simple common sense. But utilitarianism has some implications—some merely theoretical, some very practical—that are counter-intuitive. When utilitarianism runs counter to our moral intuitions, is that because of a problem with utilitarianism or with our moral intuitions? In this article, we discuss the different ways in which human moral psychology and behavior deviate from what utilitarianism prescribes. We focus on psychological deviations from key aspects of utilitarianism: impartiality, maximization, consequentialism, and aggregate-welfarist values. Finally, we consider the normative implications of psychological science for utilitarianism. We conclude that the science of morality cannot show that utilitarianism is correct but that it can cast doubt on certain intuitive arguments against utilitarianism.