Of Hidden Springs and Endless Oceans

In the wake of the active inference framework, two popular theories of consciousness high-light the relevance of insular cortex for interoceptive self-modeling (Fermin et al., 2022; Seth, 2021) and subcortical brain regions for qualitative experience (Solms, 2021). Both provide a compelling ecological argument for integrated conscious experience, i.e., self-organization of complex organisms with optimization goals that are usually parallel, multifaceted, and hard to reconcile. Computationally, both theories require some kind of self-model as basis, which could contradict credible reports of minimal phenomenal experience (MPE) (Metzinger, 2024). However, duality of conscious experience could be explained by a neuroscientific theo-ry of two distinct brain networks emerging from different neurodevelopmental pathways, leading to marked differences in cytoarchitecture and function (Luu et al., 2024; Sanides, 1962). System-A, originating from an olfactory system and amygdala-centered expansion gradient towards ventral cortex, could enable interoceptive self-modeling for habitual interac-tions with the body and the world. System-H, hippocampus-centered towards dorsal cortex, could enable less egocentric forms of cognition and experience. In this sense, MPE could be a less salient/habitual form of experience, when neither interoceptive/exteroceptive prediction errors nor spontaneous episodic memory reactivation provide self-referential engagement of System-A. System-H, if not operating on content, could give rise to self-less experience of the world as such.