Neurodiversity and attentional normativity

Abstract We argue that some recent theories of attentional normativity license predictable misevaluations of neurodivergent cognizers. We suggest that this is because norms of attention have mostly been theorized without neuroatypical cognizers in mind. We argue that because these norms tend to focus on features that only correlate with positively evaluable cognition in neurotypical agents, they are very often false when applied to neurodivergent cognition. Additionally, we suggest that these norms license unjust evaluations of neurodivergent cognizers, because they predictably evaluate neurodivergent cognition negatively, in many cases erroneously. After exploring some ways that existing views of attentional normativity might try to accommodate neurodivergent cognition, we propose a new constitutivist framework for evaluating cognition that does better.