Today's new as a phenomenon, increasingly has the character of polemically denying the entire past, declaring it fundamentally incorrect. The new is created not only as new, but as if in defiance of the past, violating all the laws and orders deduced earlier, trying to show their absolute powerlessness and irrelevance. As a result, a gap is formed between the old and the new. There is no continuity between them. The new tries to forget in terms of value and not to know anything about the past. This categorical and polemical denial of the past and the old, depriving it of the right to life carries the intention to declare it fundamentally wrong, erroneous and unviable, criminally violating all sorts of "foundations" of the present in view of its value future, and therefore the past becomes almost imaginary, non-existent, derealized. The article examines the problem of the gap between the semantic content of the idea of the new and the event-based integrity of being, which arises as a result of a morally irresponsible act. The author attempts to analyze the causes of this phenomenon as one of the factors of the modern aesthetic crisis that arose as a result of the crisis of moral responsibility of an act – a concept developed by M.M. Bakhtin. The phenomenon of the ontological gap, its causes and consequences are analyzed in the article using specific historical examples in their intersection with a philosophical context. The article attempts to link axiology and aesthetics into a systematic whole, as well as to show the necessity of this link and the impotence of aesthetics without axiology. Aesthetic vision is a product of a responsible act, therefore, if moral philosophy ceases to be the basis of life, if morality itself collapses and ceases to exist in the life and actions of a person, then any arbitrary logically coherent rationalistic theory can take its place. The idea of something new should not close in on itself, become ideological, it is only positive and creative when it knows the human face, is correlated with a real individual morally responsible assessment of it, i.e. with morality. Therefore, the author comes to the conclusion that the creation of something new as a creative act should be the product of a dutifully responsible act and should not be subordinated to a value-indifferent meaning.
Arsenii Valentinovich Velikorod (Tue,) studied this question.