In the context of the global influence of Islamic and Confucian legal traditions, the traditional doctrine of the separation of powers developed by Locke and Montesquieu can no longer be viewed as universal and indispensable. Contemporary constitutional systems of several countries demonstrate fundamentally different ways of distributing the functions of public authority that go beyond the classical triad of legislative, executive, and judicial branches. This transformation is particularly evident in Islamic states, where Sharia is integrated into the basis of power, and in China, where Confucian ideals of moral leadership intertwine with the party-state vertical. The theoretical and legal challenge lies in defining the limits of applicability of the Western model and identifying mechanisms for its adaptation or substitution in non-classical conditions. The subject of the study is, in fact, the process of transforming the idea of separation of powers into constitutional and legal mechanisms of Islamic and Confucian traditions. The work analyzes how these legal systems construct a balance of power relying not on the competition of branches but on ethical-religious and moral-philosophical foundations. Special attention is paid to comparing formal constitutional norms and the actual practice of public governance. The study employs a comparative legal method that allows for the identification of universal and local elements of institutional models. A hermeneutic approach is applied to the analysis of philosophical-legal texts of the "Lunyu," Sharia treatises, and constitutional norms. Novelty of the research and conclusions. For the first time, the concept of a "non-classical triad" is formulated, wherein the functions of public authority are redistributed through sacralized mechanisms rather than through formal checks and balances. It is shown that in Islamic states, the supremacy of divine sovereignty (hakimiyya) transforms the notions of legislative and executive power into a single system of divinely ordained legitimacy. In the Chinese paradigm, the role of Confucian principles of "" (unity) and "" (virtue) is identified as substitutes for the competition of branches of power. The practice of institutional acculturation is described, allowing for the borrowing of the separation of powers on simultaneously adapted and hybrid grounds. It is established that the lack of formal channels for internal criticism is compensated for by mechanisms of moral control and party discipline. The study confirms that non-classical legal traditions possess their own, self-sufficient tools for balancing power that do not reduce to the Western system of checks and balances.
Poyarkov et al. (Tue,) studied this question.
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