This study offers a slightly different perspective on the right-wing parties in Serbia. Media outlets, politicians, and even some researchers frequently highlight the alleged threat to Serbia's political stability posed by far-right parties. Such narratives argue that the rise of these parties, driven by platforms of nationalist revisionism and pro-Russian foreign policy, could have detrimental consequences for regional stability, European integration, and minority rights. This paper examines the existence of that perceived threat, starting from the hypothesis that the far-right in Serbia in current context does not constitute a political project with significant medium-term potential. The arguments presented are supported by an analysis of the attitudes and demographics of potential right-wing voters, derived from a longitudinal examination of public opinion data, as well as an analysis of behavior and electoral performance of these parties. The argument is premised on the notion that traditional socio-economically dissatisfied groups, which would typically form the core constituency of the far-right, are in fact mobilized by the ruling populist party in Serbia. Employing the big tent approach, the ruling party occasionally resorts to radical rhetoric while implementing completely contrasting policies, both domestic and foreign. Additionally, the Serbian far-right is fragmented and often shows signs of co-optation by the hybrid regime, contributing to its inefficiency. If confirmed, these findings would lead to the conclusion that the threat from this side of political spectrum is overstated, and primarily comes from a communication strategy of the ruling party, utilizing it in order to mobilize domestic and international support (or relieve the pressure) during critical junctures.
Dejan Bursać (Mon,) studied this question.