Armed groups seeking political or territorial change frequently challenge governments, leading to protracted armed conflicts. However, not all conflicts are resolved through decisive military victories. As a result, states have increasingly turned to secret negotiations as an alternative means of engagement. While secrecy can facilitate diplomatic flexibility, its effectiveness depends on the credibility of the government’s commitment to cooperation. This study examines how the selection of government representatives in secret negotiations influences rebel group behavior and the likelihood of cooperation. Drawing on costly signaling theory and research on secrecy in diplomacy, this study argues that the level of government representation in secret negotiations serves as a key mechanism for signaling credibility. Specifically, high‐level representatives function as costly signals, reassuring rebels of the government’s seriousness and increasing the likelihood of cooperation. By contrast, low‐level representatives provide strategic deniability but fail to generate trust, making negotiations less effective. This dynamic is particularly relevant in democratic settings, where governments face domestic audience costs if secret negotiations are exposed. To test these claims, the study employs a large‐N quantitative analysis of secret negotiations between democratic governments and rebel groups. The findings indicate that secret negotiations led by high‐level representatives significantly reduce rebel violence. In contrast, those conducted by low‐level representatives fail to establish credibility and do not contribute to de‐escalation. These results highlight the importance of credibility, the choice of representatives, and secrecy in conflict resolution, with implications for backchannel diplomacy and long‐term cooperation outcomes.
Sümeyye KAYA UYAR (Thu,) studied this question.