ABSTRACT This paper argues that Avicenna was both a necessitarian and a realist about contingency. The two aspects of his modal metaphysics are reconciled by arguing that Avicenna's modal metaphysics is founded on realism about essences: strictly speaking, an individual has no contingent properties, but a modal distinction can be made between the properties that it has by virtue of its essence (and that are thus necessary by virtue of its identity) and those that it has by virtue of extrinsic causes (and that are thus contingent with respect to its identity). Consequently, despite its realism about contingency, Avicennian modal metaphysics is not committed to the existence of counterfactual scenarios. This may seem to be in tension with the fact that Avicenna takes counterfactuals seriously in his logic. The paper argues, however, that the logical discussion of counterfactuals must be set in the framework of Avicenna's conception of the relation between modal logic and modal metaphysics: the metaphysical account of the relation between essences and modalities should provide the foundation for logic, and the purely logical kind of possibility should be understood as a case of epistemic modality. The paper concludes by claiming that such a division of labour is in potentially productive contrast to the contemporary mainstream in modal metaphysics.
Jari Kaukua (Thu,) studied this question.